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The Forgotten Proviso of § 1367(b)
(And Why We Forgot)
PETER RAVEN-HANSEN*
Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler, who helped draft 28 U.S.C. § 1367
in 1990, their chief antagonists, Professors Freer and Arthur,' and five additional
kibitzers2 destroyed most of a mid-sized forest in an initial ten-article donnybrook
about the statute. Now the prestigious panel convened by the Civil Procedure
Section of the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") in January 1998,
including three of the original despoilers, surely finished the job.' Among them,
these eleven law professors have left nothing new for anyone to say about
supplemental jurisdiction.
I will therefore revisit an old problem, or set of problems, originally identified
by Professor Freer, and the old solution, originally proposed by Professor Rowe
and his colleagues, to gauge whether the solution worked, and, if it did not, to
discuss why it failed.
Both the problems and the proffered solution were posed by § 1367(b), which
seemingly denied plaintiffs in diversity-only cases the supplemental jurisdiction
so generously extended by § 1367(a) to all claims that are part of the same case
or controversy as a jurisdictionally independent claim. Subsection 1367(b)
provides:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as
plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs
under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplementaljurisdiction over

* Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School.
1. See Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and HamperingDiversity: Life After
Finley and the Supplemental JurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991); Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or CreatingConfusion About SupplementalJurisdiction?A
Reply to ProfessorFreer,40 EMORY L.J. 943 (1991) [hereinafter Rowe, et al., Reply]; Thomas
C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Graspingat Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental
JurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991) [hereinafter Graspingat Burnt Straws];
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., A Coda on SupplementalJurisdiction,40 EMORY L.J. 993 (1991);
Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close Enoughfor Government Work What Happens
When Congress Doesn'tDo Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007 (1991).
2. See Erwin Chemerinsky, RationalizingJurisdiction,41 EMORY L.J. 3 (1992); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Debate Over § 1367: Defining the Power to Define FederalJudicial
Power,41 EMoRYL.J. 13 (1992); Karen Nelson Moore, The SupplementalJurisdictionStatute:
An ImportantBut ControversialSupplement to FederalJurisdiction,41 EMORY L.J. 31 (1992);
Wendy Collins Perdue, The New SupplementalJurisdictionStatute-FlawedBut Fixable, 41
EMORY L.J. 69 (1992); Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another PartyHeardFrom, 41 EMORY
L.J. 85 (1992).
3. I have not had the benefit of their written presentations, but am confident that they are
not pithy.
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be inconsistent with the jurisdictionalrequirements of
such claims would
4
section 1332.

According to the House report which accompanied the supplemental-jurisdiction
bill, this subsection was intended to prevent a sneaky plaintiff from evading the
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in a diversity-only case "by the
simple expedient of naming initially only those defendants whose joinder satisfies
section 1332's requirements and later adding claims not within original
jurisdiction against other defendants who have intervened or been joined on a
supplemental basis." 5
But left unqualified, § 1367(b) would have prevented even plaintiffs who are
claimed against from asserting essentially defensive counterclaims, cross-claims,
or third-party claims against nondiverse parties. When a plaintiff is claimed
against, supplemental jurisdiction can be justified to give her a fair opportunity
to defend herself fully in the federal forum. Her opportunity to evade the
complete diversity requirement is also "more attenuated" because it depends on
the double contingency that a nondiverse party will be joined by an original
defendant and will then claim against the plaintiff.6 As a result, pre-§ 1367 cases
routinely extended ancillary jurisdiction for plaintiffs' defensive claims against
nondiverse parties, according to Professor Freer. Hence one problem that he
identified with § 1367(b): its seemingly inadvertent prohibition of supplemental
jurisdiction for plaintiffs' defensive claims.'
If, however, the plaintiff in a defensive posture should not usually be regarded
as sneaky-that is, as one who pleads her case artfully from the outset to evade
the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332-then the plaintiff who is dragged into
federal court because the defendant removed the case on diversity-only grounds
should not usually be so regarded either. After all, she chose the state court to
hear her case and can usually count even less on the defendant to remove the case
to federal court than a plaintiff in federal court can count on being claimed
against by a later-joined nondiverse party.9 And so Professor Freer identified

4. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
5. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990). The report explained that the subsection thus
"implement[ed] the principal rationale of Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger," 435

U.S. 365 (1978), which had refused on "sneaky plaintiff' grounds to extend ancillary or
pendent party jurisdiction to a plaintiffs claim against a nondiverse party who had been
impleaded by the original defendant.
6. Moore, supra note 2, at 55.
7. Freer, supranote 1, at 464 n.104 (citing cases); see also Denis F. McLaughlin, The
FederalSupplementalJurisdictionStatute-A ConstitutionalandStatutoryAnalysis, 24 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 849, 945-46 (1992); Darren J. Gold, Note, Supplemental JurisdictionOver Claims by
Plaintiffs in Diversity Cases: Making Sense of28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), 93 MICH. L. REV. 2133,

2165 n.134 (1995).
8. See Freer, supra note 1, at 482-84.
9. See McLaughlin, supranote 7, at 951. Thus, Professor McLaughlin observed that in
removed actions, "the chances are remote that a plaintiff would attempt to manipulate federal
court jurisdiction by filing in state court with the hope that the defendant will then remove to
federal court and join additional parties to the action." Id.
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another problem with § 1367(b): its failure clearly to exempt removed cases from
its ban on the listed plaintiffs' claims.'
Professor Freer was also troubled that § 1367(b) prohibited the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiff intervenors of right under Rule
24(a)." Because such an intervenor usually by definition has "an interest [in the
action] ...[and] is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest,"' 2 §
1367(b)'s apparent proscription of jurisdiction for his claim denied him the
opportunity for full protection in the federal action.
But Professor Rowe and his colleagues offered a solution to these problems
which, they promised, would secure "the benefits of the lower case law
development" and avoid such "statutory rigidity." 3 They added the "Proviso" at
the end of § 1367(b) (italicized above), qualifying the proscriptions on the listed
plaintiffs' claims. The Proviso indicated that the proscriptions would apply only
"when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." They predicted
that "[s]ympathetic attention to that language, in light of the expressed
congressional intent 'to implement the principal rationale of Kroger,' should
provide a sensible answer to" the problem ofjurisdiction for plaintiff's defensive
claims that Professor Freer had identified. 4 The Proviso also theoretically
provided a solution for the problem of plaintiffs' claims in removed actions.
Because the possibility of plaintiff's evasion of the requirements of § 1332 is
attenuated in a removed action, a federal court could exercise supplemehtal
jurisdiction over his otherwise § 1367(b)-proscribed claims on the theory that it
would not be inconsistent with the complete diversity requirement of § 1332."5
Finally, although Professor Rowe and his colleagues did not suggest (or
apparently intend) that the Proviso could be applied to rescue the plaintiff
intervenor of right, nothing on its face precluded such an application.
Of course, the Proviso did not actually say any of this. It only vested an
apparent measure of discretion in the courts to decide the jurisdictional issue in
diversity-only cases on a claim-by-claim basis. Commentators were duly critical:
the Proviso was "one of the most confusing aspects of the statute"; 6 its choice of
language was "unfortunate" and would "perpetuate[] the doubt about the proper

10. Freer, supranote 1, at 485.
11. Iat at 477.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
13. Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 1, at 959; see also David D. Siegel, Practice

Commentary, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367, at 829, 834 (1994) ("The last clause of subdivision (b) of
§ 1367 may offer the courts some leeway in avoiding an overly rigid construction of the
subdivision.").
14. Rowe et al.,
Reply, supra note 1, at 960. Moreover, the Proviso offered the same
solution to another problem with § 1367(b): its apparent application to alienage cases under
§§ 1332(a) (2)-(4). Professor Rowe and his colleagues assumed that, qualified by the Proviso,
§ 1367(b) would not "lock in the complete diversity rule for alienage cases," but would simply
"leavel] the situation as it stood before." Id. at 955.
15. See id.at 960 n.90.
16. Dreyfuss, supranote 2, at 23.
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scope of the complete diversity requirement"; 7 and the lenient interpretations
urged by the draftsmen were "not compelled by the statute and require[] the
courts to read the statute creatively."' But at least its ambiguity would not make
things worse for a non-sneaky plaintiff. 9
Both the problems and a statutory solution were thus adequately identified by
the first wave of commentators. But, as Professor Freer remarked, "the proof of
this statute is in the application."2 Has the solution offered by the Proviso
worked?
I. HAS THE SOLUTION WORKED?
Seven years after enactment of the statute, I could find no case in which a court
applied the Proviso to allow supplemental jurisdiction over an otherwise
§ 1367(b)-proscribed claim. What is more, only four decisions even discuss the
Proviso, three of them invoking it against supplemental jurisdiction, and the
fourth merely quoting, without applying, Professor Siegel's practice commentary
that the Proviso might be applied to allow supplemental jurisdiction.2'
In GuaranteedSystems, Inc. v. American National Can Co.,22 the defendant in
a state court action had removed the case to federal court on diversity-only
grounds and then counterclaimed against the plaintiff, prompting plaintiff to
assert a third-party claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant. This, then,
was not only a classic defensive claim by the original plaintiff, but a defensive
claim in an action that he had originally filed in state court. The fact was not lost
on the court:
Essentially, Plaintiff acts as a defendant to [the original defendant's] claim
when it impleads [the nondiverse third-party defendant] for indemnity....
Plaintiff cannot be said to have tried to evade the requirements of the
diversity statute when it first filed in state court and then impleaded [the
third-party defendant] only in response to [the original defendant's]
counterclaim.23

Yet, far from invoking the Proviso to find supplemental jurisdiction for this claim
and thus rescue the concededly non-sneaky plaintiff, the court reluctantly read it
to prohibit supplemental jurisdiction whenever "the plaintiff and the other party

are non-diverse."24 In fact, the court complained that,
[i]f it were not bound by the plain terms of the statute, the court would be
swayed by the interests of justice and efficiency to construe Plaintiff's claim

17. Moore, supra note 2, at 44.
18. McLaughlin, supranote 7, at 951.
19. See Steinman, supranote 2, at 105 ("T]he language need not (and I would say, 'should
not') make it any more difficult to persuade a court to assert supplemental jurisdiction than it
had been before § 1367.") (parenthetical and emphasis in original).
20. Freer, supranote 1, at 966.
21. See Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. v. Northwestern Reg'l Airport Comm'n, No. 1:92
CV 576, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6858 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 1993).
22. 842 F. Supp. 855 (M.D.N.C. 1994).
23. Id. at 857.
24. Id. at 856.
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as a claim by a defendant against a person made party under Rule 14 rather
than a claim25 by a plaintiff, and thus to allow it to proceed under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(b)[!]

Thus the solution to the problem of the plaintiffs' defensive claims in diversityonly or removed actions actually became part of the problem in this case.
On comparable facts, the plaintiff in ChaseManhattanBank, N.A. v. Aldridge26
got even less sympathy for his argument that the Proviso should be applied to
permit supplemental jurisdiction over his defensive third-party claim against a
nondiverse third-party defendant. The court found that the "plain language of §
1367(b) appears to prohibit" it from exercising such jurisdiction, and then added
insult to injury by finding that "the extension of supplemental jurisdiction over
the third-party claims would assuredly be 'inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332,"' quoting the Proviso." This plaintiff had chosen
the federal forum, unlike his counterpart in GuaranteedSystems, but the court
gave no hint that it would have given the Proviso more generous application in
a removed case; "there is no reason why the plaintiff should be permitted to bring
this action against the third-party defendants when it would have been unable to
assert a claim against them ...

directly."28

Finally, in Lennox Industries,Inc. v. Yusti, the court actually acknowledged
that some commentators had suggested that the Proviso could be interpreted as
prohibiting supplemental jurisdiction "'only when [a Rule 24(a)] intervention [as
a plaintiff] is filed in an attempt to evade jurisdictional requirements."' 2 9 But it
then purported to find a "consensus" in the cases and commentary for "a more
restrictive interpretation; namely, that supplemental jurisdiction is entirely
precluded over claims by parties intervening in (or joined to) the action as
plaintiffs."3 It therefore found that the intervention of a nondiverse party as a
plaintiff would, without more, be inconsistent with the requirements of § 1332.
Lennox seems to bear out Professor Moore's prediction that "most courts will
probably view § 1367(b) as precluding supplemental jurisdiction always in the
situations specified in the statute."'"
At least in these cases the courts deigned to take notice of the Proviso, whether
or not they misconstrued it. In other cases to which it should arguably apply, the
courts ignored it altogether. In AKE Sikeston Ltd. Partnership v. Weslock
National, Inc.32 for example, the court refused to exercise supplemental

25. Id. at 857 (emphasis in original).
26. 906 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
27. Id. at 868-69.
28. Id. at 869. The court added, however, that it would not have allowed supplemental
jurisdiction over the plaintiff s third-party claims in any case because it "would not serve the
interests of justice and efficiency" in light of the fact that the plaintiff had commenced a
protective state court action against the third-party defendants. Id.
29. 172 F.R.D. 617, 622 (D.P.R. 1997) (quoting McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 969).
30. Id. at 622-23 (emphasis added) (parenthetical in original); see also Liberty Mut. Group
v. Hillman's Sheet Metal & Certified Welding, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 90, 92 (D. Me. 1996) ("[Ihe
plain language of§ 1367(b), as revised in 1990... calls into question whether district courts
may ever exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any non-diverse plaintiff-intervenor.").
31. Moore, supranote 2, at 48 (emphasis added).
32. 120 F.3d 820, 833 (8th Cir. 1997).
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jurisdiction over the plaintiff s claim against a nondiverse party impleaded by the
original defendant after the defendant had removed the action to federal court.
The court quoted the first part of § 1367(b) in support of its decision, neatly
excising the Proviso with an ellipsis.3
Nor has the commentary been kinder to the Proviso. On the AALS panel,
Professor Freer still studiously ignored the Proviso when complaining that, read
"literally," § 1367(b) disallows defensive plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse
defendants. He does not explain why the Proviso is not also part of a literal
reading. A leading treatise agrees, lamenting that "the statutory language [of §
1367(b)] ignores the possibility that a plaintiff might assert claims from a
defensive posture"34 and arguing that the prohibition of plaintiffs' cross-claims
against nondiverse parties "makes no policy sense."3" This analysis, of course,
ignores the possibility that the Proviso can be deployed to treat these claims more
sensibly.
In short, the solution that the Proviso offered to some of the problems that
Professor Freer identified has either failed outright in the handful of decisions
that have taken any notice of it at all, or has simply been forgotten in the rest.
II. WHY HAS THE SOLUTIoN FAILED?
I will suggest three reasons why the solution presented by § 1367(b)'s Proviso
has failed or been forgotten. First, such a small number of cases have presented
the problems at which it is aimed that it turns out to be a solution still searching
for a problem. Second, the plain meaning doctrine of statutory construction has
overshadowed the Proviso's delegation of common lawmaking authority to the
courts. Third, and most important, "the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332,"36 which are the benchmarks set by the Proviso, have proven far more
elusive than the draftsmen of § 1367 imagined.
A. The Small Number of Cases To Date
The heated debate triggered by the passage of § 1367 implied that a large
number of cases would be impacted by its alleged problems, justifying the
hyperbole about the § 1367 "drafting disaster '3 7 that attended the debate. My very
rough estimate of the numbers, however, shows a different picture. Of
approximately 185 cases reported on LEXIS at this writing that cite § 1367 or §
1367(b), or mention supplemental jurisdiction, almost 100 are not diversity-only
cases or make only passing and miscellaneous references to the statute without
presenting any issues relevant to this Comment. Approximately 30 involve the
joinder of nondiverse or below-limit plaintiffs' claims under Rules 20 or 23-a
problem of omission under the statute, to be sure, but not one that is addressed
33. See id.
34. 16 ROBERT C. CASADETAL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 106.42[2], at 106-59 (3d
ed. 1998).

35. Id. § 106.41, at 106-57 to 106-58.
36.28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994).
37. Graspingat Burnt Straws, supranote 1, at 972.
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by § 1367(b) or its Proviso. Approximately forty were cases that were removed
on diversity-only grounds, but only one of these apparently involved defensive
claims by the plaintiff, and only one-Guaranteed Systems, already
discussed-remarked on the fact of removal, and then promptly disregarded it in
refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff's defensive claim.3" Another 20
or so involve the attempted joinder of party-plaintiffs under Rules 24(a) or 19(a).
As noted above, courts might try to apply the Proviso in some of these cases, if
they disregard the legislative intent to resolve the prior anomalies under these
rules against supplemental jurisdiction (and here I am vastly over-simplifying),
but they have not. Most of the few remaining cases involved supplemental
jurisdiction over defendants' claims that is clearly permitted by the statute and,
again, does not implicate the Proviso. We are left with fewer than half a dozen
cases that involve plaintiffs' claims against parties who are joined under Rule 14
and one clearly wrong case finding no supplemental jurisdiction for a defendant's
claim against parties joined under Rule 13 (h) to the defendant's counterclaim.39
Now, some could take issue with how I have classified some of these cases, and
others could take more time and care than I have to get more accurate figures. But
even conceding a few cases either way under the theory of "good enough for
commentator's work," the results are revealing. Leaving to one side the removed
cases and those involving Rules 19(a) or 24(a) plaintiff-joinder, the courts have
had few reported occasions to apply the Proviso to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over an otherwise § 1367(b)-proscribed claim. Of course we cannot
know how many joinder opportunities were foregone by lawyers who read §
13 67(b) restrictively, but given its ambiguity and the problematical nature of such
a reading (according to Professor Rowe and his colleagues), it is unlikely that
many plaintiff's lawyers would have been deterred from testing the statute.
These very crude estimates suggest that Professor Rowe was essentially correct
when he speculated that plaintiffs' defensive claims "have probably come up far
more on law school exams than in reported decisions."4 He could have said the
same of removed cases more generally. Subsection 1367(b)'s Proviso, therefore,
has not been applied in the manner suggested by its draftsmen chiefly because it
has not been needed very much. Short of being applied generally to rescue all
removed plaintiffs or persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rules 19
or 24, which was apparently not the intent of the statute, the Proviso is a solution
still searching for a problem.
B. The OvershadowingEffect of PlainMeaning
Construction
In the fullest discussion to date of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's
defensive claims, a court stressed that the "plain language" of § 1367(b)'s

38. Guaranteed Sys., Inc. v. American Natl Can Co., 842 F. Supp. 855 (M.D.N.C. 1994).
39. See Mayatextil, S.A. v. Liztex U.S.A., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 4528 (LJF), 1993 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 6527 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1993).
40. Rowe et al., Reply, supranote 1,at 959.
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limitation prohibited it from exercising jurisdiction." But, of course, the Proviso
is also part of the subsection's plain language. Indeed, it seems to be inseverable
because it makes the limitations of the subsection apply only when supplemental
jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332.
It may be that the physical placement of the Proviso is partly to blame, lost, as it
is, at the end of a more precise listing of proscribed claims.42 But neither plain
language construction, nor the physical order of the plain language, can justify
ignoring the Proviso.
Perhaps the real interpretational problem is applying plain meaning to a
delegation of lawmaking authority to the courts. Plain meaning construction
arguably works best, and is most attractive, when applied to concrete, absolute
and precise terms, like the listed proscriptions of § 1367(b). Such terms
seemingly have plain meaning. The Proviso, on the other hand, simply delegates
interpretation to the courts. As one commentator has explained, it could have said
that district courts shall not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when
extending jurisdiction would violate section 1332's requirements. Instead, by
providing that federal courts should determine whether the simultaneous
exercises of supplemental and diversity jurisdictions are inconsistent,
Congress directs federal courts not to focus upon section 1332's literal
requirements, but to examine whether the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction would encourage plaintiffs' evasion of those requirements.43
This understanding of the Proviso's operation is consistent with the assertion
by Professor Rowe and his colleagues that it was intended to deal flexibly with
requirements that were themselves "a product ofjudicial interpretation."44
The rule of plain meaning construction has been touted as the antithesis of
lawmaking by judges.45 It therefore co-exists at best uneasily with a statutory
proviso that vests something like common law authority in the courts. In these
circumstances, the "plainer" meaning of the listed proscriptions of § 1367(b) is

41. See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Aldridge, 906 F. Supp. 866, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
accordLiberty Mut. Group v. Hillman's Sheet Metal & Certified Welding, Inc., 168 F.R.D.
90, 92 (D. Me. 1996) (stressing the "plain language" proscription). Of the 185 cases uncovered
in a LEXIS search for § 1367(b) and supplemental jurisdiction at this writing, no fewer than
20 invoke the "plain language" of the subsection in making their jurisdictional determination.
42. Professor Steinman suggested that it might have more bite if it preceded the listing.
Steinman, supra note 2, at 107 n.86.
43. Ellen S. Mouchawar, Note, The Congressional Resurrection of Supplemental
Jurisdictionin the Post-FinleyEra,42 HAsTINGs L.J. 1611, 1659-60 (1991) (each emphasis
in original).
44. Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 1, at 954.
45. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretationand the Power of the Judiciary,7
HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 87, 97 (1984) (noting that "plain meaning" statutory construction
permits a court to command obedience by invoking the authority of the legislature: "[tlhe
judge's authority to compel obedience comes from th[e] external decision [of the legislators
who wrote the plain language], not from the judge's own desires"). Judge Easterbrook adds,
however, apropos of the Proviso, that "[w]hen ajudge issues a ruling under the authorization
of a statute or proviso entitling ajudge to invent a common law on the subject .... the court's
claim to obedience is as strong as if the judge were enforcing a 'plain' statute." Id. Arguably,
the few courts that have considered the Proviso to date have overlooked Judge Easterbrook's
addendum.
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likely to overshadow the murkier and anachronistic assignment of decisional
authority to the courts by the Proviso. No wonder that some district courts,
transfixed by the plain meaning of the proscriptions, miss or misinterpret the
Proviso.
C. The Uncertainty of "the Requirements of Section
1332"
The most likely explanation for the failure or disregard of the Proviso,
however, is uncertainty about the meaning of "inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332. "46 There is a broad consensus that the law of
diversity jurisdiction "is filled with irrational and logically indefensible rules,"47
forming a "crazyquilt combination of sometimes vague and cryptic statutory
directives and judge-made doctrines that may or may not coincide with each other
or the preexisting statutory framework."4"
In the crazyquilt of diversity jurisdiction, "the jurisdictional requirements of
section 1332" can refer to at least three different requirements, which I will
discuss below in turn. The most obvious are the requirements for complete
diversity, read into the statute since Strawbridgev. Curtiss,49 and an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000. A third, more subtle requirement is the flexible
application of the other requirements to allow fair and efficient packaging of
claims in diversity-only actions. This requirement-which appears to have been
all but lost in the post-§ 1367 cases-may well tip the balance in favor of
exercising supplemental jurisdiction for many otherwise § 1367(b)-proscribed
claims. After all, Professor McLaughlin reminds us, "[t]he final phrase has no
added meaning unless it was intended as a qualification of the general
proscription against supplemental jurisdiction for claims by plaintiffs." 5
1. Complete Diversity
Professor Rowe explained that the requirement of § 1332 that he and his
colleagues had in mind was complete diversity: they intended only to prohibit the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction "when that exercise would permit ready
circumvention of the complete diversity requirement."'" Most of the courts have
agreed, reading the rule of complete diversity as the sole object of § 1367(b)'s

46. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994).
47. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 5.
48. Martin H. Redish, Reassessingthe Allocation of JudicialBusiness Between State and
FederalCourts: FederalJurisdictionand "The MartianChronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769,
1769 (1992).
49. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
50. McLaughlin, supranote 7, at 948. More accurately, since the subsection has no general
proscription on such claims but only a proscription of listed claims, the Proviso has no meaning
except as a qualification on this more limited proscription.
51. Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 1, at 953.
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proscriptions in general 2 or of the Proviso in particular.53 There are at least three
problems with this reading of § 1367(b).
First, the Proviso's cross-reference to "the jurisdictional requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332" cannot meanjust complete diversity54 because that makes the
Proviso superfluous. A party in a diversity-only case does not need supplemental
jurisdiction unless the opposing party is nondiverse (or the supplemental claim
is below-limit)." The Proviso's reference to the "jurisdictional requirements of
section 1332" therefore necessarily means something other than complete
diversity on the supplemental claim. The inquiry is necessarily not just whether
the supplemental claim violates the requirements of the statute-which it does by
definition-but rather whether it is "inconsistent" with them, as noted above.
Second, the complete diversity rule is itself, in the view of many commentators,
"incoherent, irrational, and indefensible," as one put it in oral remarks to the
panel.5 6 Because the complete diversity requirement is itself "in no way consistent
with the underlying legitimate purposes of the diversity jurisdiction," Professor
Redish reminds us that, "it makes no sense to shape supplemental jurisdiction in
a manner designed to protect the complete diversity requirement."5 " The Proviso,
then, is ambiguous about whether it measures inconsistency against the irrational
complete diversity rule, or, more broadly, against the diversity statute itself. The
two are not congruent.
Third, the subsection does not plainly state that its intent is only to prevent the
sneaky plaintiff from evading the complete diversity rule. Its silence permitted the
court in Lennox Industries to reject the sneaky-plaintiff interpretation of the
subsection in favor of an absolute proscription of the listed plaintiff's claims.
Moreover, had the subsection more plainly targeted the sneaky plaintiff, the court
might still have been at a loss to identify him confidently. 8 Even the plaintiff
asserting a "defensive" claim, after all, may have framed his initial action to
invite a claim that would present the opportunity for claiming against a
nondiverse party. Often only circumstantial evidence of subjective intent would
distinguish the sneaky defensive plaintiff from the non-sneaky. Neither § 1367(b)
nor its legislative history provide any guidance to the courts in drawing this
distinction. The alternative, however, to ad hoc line-drawing is categorical
classification, which may explainwhy the subsection's categorical proscription
on plaintiff's claims against certain defendants has been enforced so often in
disregard of the qualifier added by the Proviso.

52. See Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that § 1367(b)
"speaks only to preventing attempts by plaintiffs to circumvent complete diversity").
53. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 972 F. Supp. 1386, 1392 (N.D. Ala. 1997) ("The
[Proviso] clearly refers to the doctrine of complete diversity.")
54. See Guaranteed Sys., Inc. v. American Nat'i Can Co., 842 F. Supp. 855, 856 (M.D.N.C.
1994).
55. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 2, at 75; Gold, supra note 7, at 2152.
56. Roger H. Trangsrud, Remarks at the AALS Section on Civil Procedure, Symposium on
a Reappraisal of the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Jan. 9, 1998).
57. Redish, supra note 48, at 1819.
58. See Gold, supranote 7, at 2157.
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2. Amount in Controversy
In finding that § 1367(b) addresses the complete diversity requirement of
§ 1332, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit added that nothing in the
subsection precludes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for below-limit
claims. 9 Thus, it would presumably find the subsection's proscription
inapplicable to the plaintiff s impleader of a diverse third-party defendant on a
below-limit claim.' Some commentators agree, asserting that every claim subject
to the subsection "necessarily involves a claim against a nondiverse party,, 61 thus
ignoring the possibility of a diverse below-limit claim.
If this is true, however, it certainly is not compelled or supported by the plain
language of the statute. The Proviso looks to "the jurisdictional requirements of
section 1332," which plainly include the amount in controversy. Indeed, if
anything, this requirement is plainer than the complete diversity requirement,
which is only a judicial gloss on the "citizens of different states" language of
§ 1332.62 In Pellegrinov. Pesch,63 the court therefore refused, because it "would
be inconsistent with § 1332's jurisdictional requirements" to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's below-limit claim against a diverse
defendant joined under Rule 20(a) with a diverse defendant against whom other
claims in the aggregate satisfied the amount in controversy requirement.
But this requirement presents the same interpretative problems presented by the
complete diversity requirement. The Proviso's reference cannot simply mean that
every supplemental claim must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement
because then the Proviso would be superfluous. Moreover, the amount in
controversy requirement arguably embraces at least some part of the pre-§ 1367
case law on aggregation of claims, which, for example, permitted aggregation of
claims against a single defendant in Pellegrinoto satisfy the amount, but did not
permit aggregation between defendants. Although one commentator finds the
rules of aggregation "fixed and unassailable" in urging their application in
§ 1367(b)," the better view is that they have "evolved haphazardly and with little
reasoning" and "serve no apparent policy."65 If this is an accurate view of them,
the amount in controversy requirement again presents the question whether the

59. See Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 1995).
60. See also Corporate Resources, Inc. v. Southeast Suburban Ambulatory Surgical Ctr.,
Inc., 774 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. 111.1991) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's
below-limit claim against an original co-defendant without discussing § 1367(b)).
61. Gold, supra note 7, at 2152.
62. See 16 CASAD ETAL., supra note 34, § 106.45[3], at 106-70. Most commentators have
agreed that the subsection addresses the amount in controversy requirement of § 1332, as well
as complete diversity. See Arthur D. Wolf, CodificationofSupplementalJurisdiction:Anatomy
ofa LegislativeProposal,14 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 41 (1992); McLaughlin, supra note 7,
at 970; Laura L. Hirschfeld, The $50,000 Question: Does Supplemental JurisdictionExtend
to Claims Between Diverse Parties Which Do Not Meet § 1332's Amount-in-Controversy
Requirement?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 107, 139 (1995).
63. No. 91-C-4967, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9507, at *18-19 (N.D. II1. June 26, 1992).
64. Hirschfeld, supra note 62, at 135.
65. CHARLES ALAN WRiGHT, LAW oF FEDERAL CouRTs § 36, at 209 (5th ed. 1994).
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Proviso measures consistency of supplemental jurisdiction over a below-limit
claim against the illogical case law of aggregation, or against some broader and
presumably more coherent policy of § 1332. Because some courts and
commentators have ignored the amount in controversy requirement altogether in
considering the Proviso, it has also been left unclear whether the "sneaky
plaintiff' test was intended to apply to below-limit claims as well as to claims
against nondiverse parties. If it was, we have the same practical problems in
applying it to the former that we have in applying it to the latter.
3. Fairness and Efficiency
In GuaranteedSystems, the court lamented that the plain terms of § 1367(b)
prevented it from serving "the interests ofjustice and efficiency""' by exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over the removed plaintiff's defensive third-party claim
against a nondiverse party. This lament assumed not only that the complete
diversity requirement was absolute, but also that it was the sole relevant
requirement of § 1332 (the claims were all above-limit). The assumption ignores
another made by the Supreme Court in Kroger: "that, in generally requiring
complete diversity, Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of federal
courts so inflexibly that they are unable to protect legal rights or effectively to
resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit. Those practical needs are the basis
of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 67 In other words, the complete diversity
and amount in controversy requirements are themselves softened by a third
"practical" requirement of flexibility-flexibility to achieve fairness and justice
("to protect legal rights"), as well as efficiency (to "effectively ...resolve an
entire, logically entwined lawsuit"). 68
Of course, the efficiency goal of this flexibility was partly codified in §
1367(a), which authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over all claims in the same
case or controversy with an independent claim, and partly in § 1367(c), which
effectively gives the court discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction when it would be just as efficient for a state court to hear the
supplemental claim. But Professor Siegel also saw the goal of efficiency at work
in the Proviso:
If the situation is one in which the court can be convinced that the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction would not undermine the complete-diversity
requirement of § 1332, and that the exercise would expedite the disposition
of the case while the rejection of supplemental jurisdiction would not spare
the federal court all that much, especially where the claims already before the
court rest on a firm jurisdictional foundation and would have to remain for
adjudication even if the added claim should be rejected, the final clause of
subsection (b) should afford the court a tool with which to sustain
supplemental jurisdiction of the added claim. It would certainly contribute
to a more economical use of the time of both the federal and state courts, a

66. Guaranteed Sys., Inc. v. American Nat'l Can Co., 842 F. Supp. 855, 857 (M.D.N.C.
1994).
67. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978).
68. Id.
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motive that also lies behind the pendent and ancillary doctrines that are now
embraced under "supplemental" jurisdiction. 9

More significantly, the fairness goal of flexibility should also be read into the
Proviso of § 1367(b). In fact, this requirement may help to explain what more is
needed, beyond the inevitable incomplete diversity or insufficient amount in
controversy, to make exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a claim identified
in § 1367(b) inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332. The
answer suggested by Kroger's assumption is that the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over a plaintiff's nondiverse or below-limit claim against a listed
requirements when it is not
defendant is inconsistent with § 1332's jurisdictional
70
necessary to achieve fairness to the plaintiff.
Of course, with this answer and a dollar the overburdened federal judge could
buy a cup of coffee. Whether the exercise ofjurisdiction is necessary to permit
fair and efficient packaging of the action is an unavoidably ad hoc and sometimes
subjective inquiry. The pre-§ 1367 case law may serve as one reference point, but
be too ambiguous and inconsistent to lend much consistency to the
it may itself
71
inquiry.

On the other hand, why flinch at vesting-or leaving-some discretion in the
courts to achieve fairness and efficiency in actions that satisfy the constitutional
case or controversy requirement? As Professor Dreyfuss reasoned,
Since the judiciary has the expertise and information needed to assess the
effect on the parties of deciding only parts of their dispute, it is in the best
position to know what reach it needs in order to assure that justice is done.
Since the judiciary also understands how the docket would suffer under a
positioned to weigh the costs and
broad construction ofjurisdiction, it is
7 well
benefits of extending this authority.

Subsection 1367(b) is perhaps best seen as a flexible proscription on the probably
few plaintiffs or plaintiff-intervenors who try to play fast and loose with the
complete diversity or amount in controversy requirements of the diversity statute,
leaving the courts considerable leeway in identifying such sneaky plaintiffs
circumstantially and in packaging the claims of the remaining plaintiffs fairly and
efficiently in diversity-only actions.
CONCLUSION

When the manifold jurisdictional requirements of § 1332 are understood, §
1367(b)'s Proviso appears to be a laudable attempt to soften the "plain language"
rigidity of the subsection's proscriptions without locking the federal courts into
the prior case law of ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction or attempting to

69. Siegel, supranote 13, at 834.
70. Indeed, an early draft of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute actually authorized
supplemental jurisdiction "if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice to a party or third
party." 1 FEDERAL CoURTs STUDY CoMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITEE REPORTS
563-68 (1990).
71. See, e.g., Shay S. Scott, Comment, Supplemental JurisdictionUnder28 US.C.§ 1367,
72 OR. L. REv. 695, 725 (1993); Wolf, supra note 62, at 43.

72. Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 23-24.
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anticipate every possible joinder scenario. Its apparent failure to date may be
nothing more than validation of Professor Rowe's prediction that most of the
problems that Professor Freer identified-for which the Proviso was
tailored-would be rare. It may, however, also raise a caution about attempts to
vest common lawmaking authority in the courts in an age of plain language
statutory construction. Ultimately, however, its failure probably chiefly reflects
the impracticality of asking the federal courts to exercise a flexible and sensible
supplemental jurisdiction by referring them generically to a body of law that is
neither.

